Zyxel has issued another security fix for GS1900 switches, after researchers found an attacker-used exploit still worked against June’s repaired firmware. Its November 3 advisory identifies CVE-2026-107441 and lists ten affected models. Administrators who already addressed CVE-2026-7273 need to check again.
Evidence status: source-reported exploitation, supported by a recovered exploit and researchers’ firmware and hardware tests. The sources do not establish whether any particular reader’s switch was compromised.
The earlier patch left the recovered attack working
Fernando Mercês and Yegor Vasilenko at Binarly found the exploit while investigating infrastructure associated with the Red Heron campaign. It included targeting information for firmware already patched for CVE-2026-7273. Binarly says it confirmed on September 28 that all ten of those repaired releases remained vulnerable.
The new flaw corrupts memory while the web management program processes request parameters. Zyxel describes a LAN-based attacker who needs no login and can potentially execute operating-system commands. Access to the management interface is the exposure condition. Being behind a router does not protect against an attacker who can already reach that interface from an allowed network.
Binarly notified Zyxel on September 29. The vendor confirmed a separate vulnerability on October 11, released new firmware on October 22, and published its advisory on November 3. Those are disclosure and repair dates, not the beginning of attacks.
Lawrence Abrams’s November 4 BleepingComputer report connects the correction to GreyNoise’s earlier investigation. GreyNoise reported configuration and hashed-root-credential theft from 996 switches across 48 countries, using sensor observations and attacker-infrastructure data.
That is GreyNoise’s reported campaign count, not an independently measured worldwide total. Its September report attributed the exploit to CVE-2026-7273; Binarly’s later analysis identifies the separate flaw. Whether the attacker deliberately bypassed June’s fix remains unclear.
Match the firmware to the exact model
Zyxel’s advisory supplies these model-specific affected and fixed versions:
| Switch model | Affected firmware, including earlier versions | Fixed firmware |
|---|---|---|
| GS1900-8 | 2.90(AAHH.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHH.3)C0 |
| GS1900-8HP | 2.90(AAHI.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHI.3)C0 |
| GS1900-10HP | 2.90(AAZI.2)C0 | 2.90(AAZI.3)C0 |
| GS1900-16 | 2.90(AAHJ.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHJ.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24 | 2.90(AAHL.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHL.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24E | 2.90(AAHK.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHK.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24EP | 2.90(ABTO.2)C0 | 2.90(ABTO.3)C0 |
| GS1900-24HPv2 | 2.90(ABTP.2)C0 | 2.90(ABTP.3)C0 |
| GS1900-48 | 2.90(AAHN.2)C0 | 2.90(AAHN.3)C0 |
| GS1900-48HPv2 | 2.90(ABTQ.2)C0 | 2.90(ABTQ.3)C0 |
Use the vendor’s model-specific update and confirm the running version afterward. A record saying “June security update installed” is insufficient. Restrict management access to the administrators and protected networks that require it while arranging the update.
Patching and investigating answer different questions
Previously reachable switches deserve a review through the normal incident-response process. Preserve available logs and configuration evidence. Check for unauthorized changes and investigate whether configuration files or credentials were copied.
Where exposure is established, replace affected credentials and review any reused secrets or network access they enabled. An installed patch closes the documented entry point; it cannot retrieve a stolen configuration or establish a clean device history. The reviewed advisory supplies no complete compromise-recovery procedure, so coordinate suspected-device recovery with the supplier.
Caveat: Binarly and GreyNoise sell security products and supply the research findings; Zyxel supplies the repair matrix. Their reports do not establish a complete victim inventory.