Disclosure of Vulnerability in Radicle's Network Protocol — The Radicle Team
Radicle is a peer-to-peer, local-first code collaboration stack built on Git, and it just published two critical vulnerabilities in the network protocol its nodes speak. Every version released to date is affected. The team is shipping the disclosure ahead of the fix on purpose: no later patch can undo an exposure that already happened. The two flaws: Node-to-node traffic is neither encrypted nor authenticated — anyone able to observe the path between two nodes reads whatever they exchange, in plain text (reported 2026-06-24 by Konstantinos Maninakis) Peer authentication in the handshake is broken, so an attacker can present a Node ID that is not theirs; since private repositories are shared by allow-listing Node IDs, a faked allow-listed ID can fetch a private repository directly, without sitting on the path at all (reported 2026-08-12 by cryptocode) Alone, the impersonation flaw is hard — you have to know an allow-listed Node ID, and the allow-list is not public. Together they compound: a path attacker sees the Node IDs at both ends, both normally allow-listed, reads everything while watching, then uses a Node ID they observed to pull whole repositories on demand Integrity was never the problem. Git objects and signed references still verify at the storage layer, so nobody can forge code or identities — the failure is confidentiality What they tell users to do now: ...