Trigger.dev says an attacker gained unauthorized access to environment variables belonging to a subset of organizations using its task platform. In its November 1 disclosure, the company says it blocked the exploit and emailed affected account owners with mitigation steps.

Evidence status: access reported by the affected provider. Its status notice, posted at 22:50 UTC, labels the incident resolved while promising more details. A resolved status does not by itself revoke credentials exposed before containment.

What customers can check

Environment variables can hold API keys, database credentials and other secrets used by application jobs. Organization owners should check the email associated with their Trigger.dev account and follow any incident-specific instructions. If an exposed variable contained a credential, revoke or rotate it with the issuing service, update the application and review relevant access and billing logs.

Update — November 7, 2026, 04:43 EST

Trigger.dev’s November 6 follow-up report, attributed to Matt Aitken, adds material exposure and recovery details. It supersedes the initial notice’s lack of a customer-impact figure and explanation of which credentials were obtained.

The company says the attacker obtained customer root API keys for some environments. Those keys give full access to an environment’s settings, including its variables. Trigger.dev reports 0.66% of all customers affected, without publishing an absolute count.

In some environments, the attacker also listed recent runs, deployments and schedules. Those responses include identifiers, task names, tags, metadata and some deployment errors. Trigger.dev says it found no evidence of access to other customer data, production databases, services or dashboard accounts. These are the provider’s investigation findings, not an independent verification of every downstream credential’s use.

Affected customers still need to replace downstream secrets

Trigger.dev says it revoked all exposed Trigger.dev API keys. Customers must regenerate the required platform keys and rotate credentials stored in affected environments, including database passwords, third-party keys and access tokens. Revoke the old credentials at their issuers; replacing a Trigger.dev key cannot invalidate a database password copied earlier.

Check both the account email and the dashboard banner. The provider identifies notification emails sent around 21:36 UTC November 1 and 20:27 UTC November 2. It says organizations without an impact notification were unaffected. Contact its support team if account status is unclear.

The report explicitly says self-hosted deployments were not impacted by this attack and webhook signing secrets were not exposed. For self-hosters, it separately recommends single-tenant operation with WHITELISTED_EMAILS limited to controlled accounts. That is hardening guidance, not a patch for a reported self-hosted compromise.

The initial attack vector remains undisclosed. Trigger.dev says it has engaged incident-response specialists and law enforcement, and added scoped-key IP allowlisting and OIDC support. Those changes do not replace rotation of already exposed secrets.

Caveat: Trigger.dev remains the source for scope and containment; the report does not identify the entry point or establish whether stolen downstream credentials were used.