CERT-In disclosed four weaknesses in Tata Motors’ iRA 2.0 and iRA.ev connected-car apps. They include service credentials embedded in downloadable packages and authentication tokens exposed through app behavior. The November 4 advisory, CIVN-2026-0537, credits researcher Pranav Rajendran.
Tata says it already released repairs in August and September. Mohammad Rameez Anas’s November 5 reporting for TOI Auto carries the company’s response: mandatory updates reached active users, while outreach continues to customers who have not updated.
Evidence status: published vulnerability disclosures with vendor-reported remediation. Tata says its assessment found no evidence of unauthorized access to customer credentials, personal information or vehicle data. The reviewed sources establish neither a confirmed attack campaign nor a count of compromised vehicles.
Four weaknesses have different access requirements
The apps provide vehicle status, trip information and connected services, including remote commands. Access to those services depends on the credentials or user session an attacker obtains. The advisory does not demonstrate control of every vehicle function.
- CVE-2026-121144 — credentials inside the app package. CERT-In describes hardcoded service-account credentials, API keys and authorization tokens. An attacker can obtain the package without a customer login. The resulting backend access depends on what those credentials authorize.
- CVE-2026-121145 — untrusted content inside the app. Insufficient URL and origin checks affect the WebView, an embedded browser component. Malicious content loaded there could interact with app functionality and obtain bearer tokens, which authorize whoever possesses them.
- CVE-2026-121146 — tokens in logs. Development and debugging logs contain authentication tokens. This route requires local access to the logs; it is not the same unauthenticated remote path as downloading a package.
- CVE-2026-121147 — ineffective certificate pinning. The app’s extra check that a server presents an expected certificate is improperly implemented. CERT-In describes interception or modification by an attacker positioned to intercept network traffic.
Those conditions matter more than treating four identifiers as four equivalent remote attacks. CERT-In’s records describe potential consequences, not evidence that each route was used against customers.
Check the installed app, including on a rarely used phone
CERT-In specifies these versions:
| Application | Affected versions | Advisory’s repair version |
|---|---|---|
| Tata Motors iRA 2.0 | 26.7.3 and below | 26.8.2 |
| Tata Motors iRA.ev | 26.7.2 and below | 26.9.1 |
Install the current official app-store update and check the installed version against the advisory. Tata’s statement about active users does not verify the version on a dormant phone or a device that missed updates. Use established Tata support channels for unexpected account activity or difficulty updating.
The sources provide no supported reason to claim a fleet-wide breach, replace a vehicle or prescribe a universal password reset. A password change alone also would not repair embedded service credentials or network-validation code.
Mobile packages cannot keep a shared service secret
For software teams, a distributed client sits outside the service owner’s control. A service credential shipped inside it needs a recovery path at the backend as well as a code fix.
The defensive review should cover revoking or replacing exposed shared credentials, narrowing their permissions and examining their past use. Stop recording session tokens in production logs. Keep untrusted web content separate from authenticated app capabilities and test the actual network-validation behavior.
These are engineering implications of the disclosed mechanisms. The advisory does not document which backend credentials Tata rotated, how historical token access was investigated or what audit evidence supports the company’s scope assessment.
What the thread adds
In the Hacker News discussion, qtqtqt links the TOI Auto report carrying Tata’s response. That supplies important chronology: this week’s disclosure describes flaws the company says it repaired months earlier. The linked reporting supports “no evidence found” in Tata’s assessment, rather than proof that no leak ever occurred.
From a 5-comment thread, in HN’s own order.
Caveat: Tata supplies the remediation and no-observed-compromise assurances; the public advisory and reporting do not independently verify the complete rollout or historical access.