CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 17. The Puppet flaw lets a client with a signed agent certificate run code as the Puppet Server service user. That threatens the management system trusted to configure other machines.

Update the code used by the server and restart the server process. Restricting new certificate enrollment reduces exposure, but clients that already hold a valid certificate can still reach the flaw.

A client report became executable code

Puppet agents send reports describing configuration changes and events. The vulnerable server converts certain report values back into Ruby objects, a process called deserialization. A malicious event can make that conversion execute code.

Perforce’s CVE record, first published November 3, confirms the certificate requirement. If the certificate authority automatically signs requests without strong verification, an unauthorized network client can obtain the credential needed to attack.

The OpenVox advisory describes the same report-processing defect in the Puppet-derived project. It warns that server-side execution can expose the certificate authority’s signing key. Further execution on managed hosts depends on how orchestration is configured; a server compromise does not prove that every client was reached.

Evidence status: CISA-listed exploitation in the wild. The public technical advisory also supplies a controlled demonstration. CISA’s listing gives no victim count, campaign details or first-exploitation date, and marks ransomware use unknown.

Match the repair to the product

Perforce’s published CVE record gives these Puppet Enterprise boundaries:

Release line Affected range Fixed release
2023.8 2023.8.0 through releases before 2023.8.13 2023.8.13
2025 2025.0.0 through releases before 2025.12.1 2025.12.1
2026 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.1 2026.0.1

The vendor says to upgrade to a release bundling puppet-agent 8.22.2 or 9.1.3, then restart Puppet Server so it loads the fixed code. Updating packages only on managed endpoints leaves the central server’s repair unverified.

For OpenVox, Ben Ford’s November 3 release guidance, updated November 4, lists:

  • openvox-server 8.18.0 or 9.2.0, or newer.
  • openvox-agent 8.32.0 or 9.3.0, or newer.

These are different product version schemes. For bundled or distribution-provided installations, use that supplier’s fixed package and restart guidance. Ford’s release also addresses separate authorization defects; do not treat every issue in that announcement as this one CVE.

Review trust as well as the running version

The OpenVox maintainers recommend limiting server reachability to network segments that need it and disabling or tightening automatic certificate signing. Those controls narrow who can submit reports. They do not repair the unsafe conversion or neutralize an already compromised client certificate.

For an exposed management server:

  • Verify its installed packages and completed restart. Check every server that processes reports, including bundled installations.
  • Review certificate enrollment and existing trust. Investigate unexpected signed certificates, enrollment changes and use of service credentials.
  • Preserve relevant logs and investigate suspicious server activity. A patch prevents this path from being used again; it cannot establish that signing keys or other secrets were never copied.
  • Scope recovery to the evidence. If compromise is found, assess the certificate authority and downstream management access before declaring the fleet recovered.

CISA lists December 1 as the federal remediation due date. That is neither the vulnerability’s publication date nor a universal legal deadline for all operators.

Caveat: The sources establish the defect and an exploitation signal, but publish no complete incident account. Perforce and OpenVox maintain the affected products; their advisories do not establish the history of a particular deployment.