GitBook says an attacker gained access to infrastructure credentials at 19:00 CET on November 2. Its November 3 security notice now tells customers to rotate tokens and integration secrets. The app, API and published documentation are available again, although some services remain degraded.
Evidence status: unauthorized access reported by the affected provider. GitBook says the attacker may have accessed integration tokens, Git Sync secrets, API tokens and visitors’ questions to GitBook Assistant. It has found no evidence that documentation content was modified. That statement leaves confidentiality and the full scope of access unresolved.
Replace credentials where they were issued
GitBook says it blocked the attacker, closed the vulnerabilities and replaced every credential and secret across its infrastructure. It also revoked all personal API tokens. Customers still have work to do:
- Replace GitBook API tokens. Update applications and automation that used the revoked tokens, then verify that their intended operations work.
- Rotate connected-service tokens and secrets. Replace credentials used to connect external tools to GitBook with the issuing service. GitBook’s revocation of its own tokens does not establish that an outside service’s credential has been invalidated.
- Rotate secrets in published integrations. Include integrations your organization publishes, as the notice explicitly requests.
- Re-authenticate the GitBook MCP server. MCP is the standard for connecting AI agents to tools. GitBook specifically requires a new authentication, so coordinate it with the organization’s administrator.
Inventory Git Sync connections as part of that review because Git Sync secrets appear in the possible-exposure list. The notice supplies no separate, detailed recovery procedure for each Git provider. Ask GitBook support which credentials apply to your connection when the mapping is unclear.
As follow-through, review available access logs for the affected credentials and their permissions. Replacing a token stops future use of that token; it cannot undo earlier access. These are incident-response precautions, not a claim that every integration was abused.
Use the later security notice, not the earlier outage advice
GitBook’s 16:21 CET update asks customers to take action. Its 13:15 CET notice had said none was required yet. The availability incident page also retains an earlier “You don’t need to do anything right now” message. Read the later security instructions when deciding whether to rotate credentials.
There is no customer-installable fixed version or published CVE in the reviewed disclosure. GitBook attributes the attack to AI agents but has not released the entry route or a technical reconstruction. Service restoration alone cannot establish that all connected credentials are safe.
What the thread adds
In the Hacker News discussion, petecooper links the provider’s security notice. philipwhiuk points out that the status summary and incident details omit information found in the circulated customer message. Reading both first-party pages confirms why the distinction matters: availability updates and credential-rotation instructions appear in different places.
From a 6-comment thread, in HN’s own order.
Caveat: GitBook is reporting on its own incident; possible credential access and its AI-agent attribution remain subject to a promised postmortem.