Drupal fixed an installer vulnerability that can let an anonymous attacker take over an existing site. Under specific conditions, attempting to reinstall Drupal can lead to remote code execution. Update core and block public access to the installer after installation.

The Drupal Security Team published SA-CORE-2026-017, CVE-2026-132165, on November 18. Sergiu Gatlan’s November 19 reporting explains the release and temporary protection. The first-party advisory supplies the exposure qualifications and repaired versions.

File permissions reduce some paths, not every path

Drupal ships its browser installer at /core/install.php. Once a site is installed, that script usually has no ongoing public role. A new site in a multisite installation is one reason an administrator might need it again.

The advisory rates the flaw as requiring no authentication, with complex attack conditions and uncommon exploitable configurations. It does not publish a complete checklist of those conditions. Preventing the web server from writing to or changing permissions on settings.php mitigates some exploit paths. Drupal does not describe that permission restriction as complete protection.

Evidence status: Drupal reports an existing proof of concept, without identifying an in-the-wild campaign in the reviewed sources. Its warning that exploits could emerge quickly is a forecast, not evidence that these new flaws have already been used against victims. Earlier attacks against Drupal Commerce concern a different vulnerability.

Match the core update to the supported branch

The official advisory identifies these repaired releases:

Supported branch Affected branch versions Fixed release
Drupal 10.6.x Versions before 10.6.22 10.6.22
Drupal 11.3.x Versions before 11.3.22 11.3.22
Drupal 11.4.x Versions before 11.4.13 11.4.13

Its complete affected range is <10.6.22 || >=11.0.0 <11.3.22 || >=11.4.0 <11.4.13. Drupal 10.5.x and earlier, and 11.2.x and earlier, receive no security coverage. Drupal 8 and 9 are also end-of-life. Those installations need a supported upgrade path rather than an assumed repair for their old branch.

The same releases fix CVE-2026-132166, a separate gadget chain: existing methods that become dangerous when another flaw deserializes untrusted data. Drupal explicitly says this second issue is not directly exploitable. Keep its prerequisites separate from the anonymous installer flaw.

Make the installer block survive the next deployment

Drupal’s installer-hardening guide, updated November 18, recommends blocking the installer in the web server configuration. That protection persists when core is updated. The advisory recommends this hardening alongside the patch and as protection when an immediate upgrade is impossible.

The guide identifies several maintenance traps:

  • Cover the actual installation path and every serving virtual host, including HTTPS. A subdirectory installation needs its corresponding path.
  • Include paths with extra text after the script name. Some nginx configurations can still execute the installer through such a path when an exact-match block protects only the bare filename.
  • Keep Apache directives in the right configuration context. A server-only directive placed in .htaccess can take the whole site offline.
  • Persist scaffold changes. Composer can replace a hand-edited .htaccess; Drupal documents appending a maintained file through its scaffold configuration.
  • Treat deleting the installer as a deployment task. Composer can restore it, and deployments that skip scripts can skip automatic removal.

After an operator applies the documented protection, Drupal recommends checking that the installer and its alternate paths end in 403 or 404. Confirm ordinary site behavior and database updates still work. update.php is a separate script and should not be blocked accidentally by an overbroad rule.

Drupal Steward, a paid web application firewall service, protects its subscribers from known attack vectors according to the advisory. Drupal still recommends upgrading because additional paths might be discovered. Anthropic’s OSS Scanner receives discovery credit; the repair and hardening guidance come from Drupal’s security team.

Caveat: The advisory leaves the full exploitation conditions unpublished; neither permissions alone nor a firewall subscription establishes that an unpatched site is safe.