ClickHouse has released fixes for CVE-2026-116366, a flaw that could let an unauthenticated network user run arbitrary code on ClickHouse Server. Its October 30 security changelog says exploitation requires “certain conditions,” but does not describe them.

Evidence status: a vendor-disclosed vulnerability with released fixes. The vendor-authored CVE record identifies an integer overflow, where a number exceeds its permitted range. It credits Elshad Toklayev as the reporter. Neither source supplies a technical attack account or a confirmed victim count.

The record’s October 30, 16:36 UTC CISA assessment records exploitation as “none.” That is a dated assessment of available evidence, not proof that attacks cannot occur. The vendor classifies attack complexity as high; that qualification does not remove the need to patch reachable servers.

Match the fix to the server you operate

The changelog gives these open-source release baselines:

ClickHouse release line First fixed release listed
26.3 26.3.62.3-lts
26.8 26.8.36.3-lts
26.9 26.9.27.3-stable
26.10 26.10.3.7-stable

The vendor CVE record marks versions from each listed branch through before its fixed release as affected. Its default status for the open-source product is also affected. An unlisted older branch should therefore prompt a support or upgrade decision, rather than an assumption that it is safe.

ClickHouse says the fix has been applied to all ClickHouse Cloud and BYOC deployments. BYOC means a vendor-managed deployment in the customer’s own cloud account. It should not be confused with a separately operated, self-hosted server in that same cloud.

The CVE record contains a separate ClickHouse Cloud version table. Aggregated vulnerability pages can flatten those entries into the same product name. Use the deployment-specific vendor guidance before comparing a version number; a managed-cloud baseline does not establish that a self-hosted binary contains the repair.

Credentials alone do not close a pre-authentication flaw

An operator’s immediate tasks are to:

  • Identify the deployed server version and release line. Include independently managed instances, rather than relying on the status of a hosted account.
  • Install a supported release containing the appropriate fix, then verify that the repaired server is actually running.
  • Restrict database network access to the clients that need it while arranging the update. This reduces reachability; it does not repair the vulnerable server.
  • Preserve relevant access and service records if suspicious activity is present. A successful upgrade cannot establish whether earlier access occurred.

Those are practical response steps derived from the advisory. The public notice supplies no reliable compromise test, narrower configuration exemption or documented workaround. Requiring a database password is insufficient grounds to dismiss a flaw described as unauthenticated.

Caveat: ClickHouse is the affected vendor and the source of the fix and managed-service assurances. The exact triggering conditions and any real-world exploitation remain unresolved in the reviewed disclosure.