Check Point reports intrusions into unpatched Security Gateways that combined a vulnerable Mobile Access portal with a separate local root flaw. Its November 12 investigation describes persistent backdoors and, in one investigated intrusion, movement to a VMware ESXi host followed by destructive activity.

The initial access involved PHP2Shell, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619. Our existing PHP coverage separates runtime fixes, demonstrations and earlier attack evidence. This incident adds appliance-specific exposure and a second vulnerability that needs its own fix.

A local flaw became the second step

Check Point’s DynamicCLI advisory identifies CVE-2026-123039. A root process accepted commands through a local socket that any local user could write to, without authenticating the caller. Exploiting this flaw requires existing local code execution. It is not, by itself, an unauthenticated internet entry point.

In the reported gateway intrusion, access through the portal supplied that prerequisite. Attackers then escalated from the portal account to root. Check Point says the local flaw was actively exploited against a couple of dozen customers.

The advisory lists affected branches R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10 and R81. Products include Force Firewalls, Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain servers and Maestro Orchestrator. Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud are listed as unaffected. The broader product list concerns the local flaw; the reported remote entry path concerns vulnerable Mobile Access gateways.

Verify both fixes and investigate earlier access

For CVE-2026-123039, the vendor lists these first fixed Jumbo Hotfix Accumulator builds:

Branch First fixed Take
R82.20 14
R82.10 52
R82 132
R81.20 174

Those thresholds address the local escalation flaw. Also confirm the appliance has its PHP2Shell fixes. Updating an unrelated PHP installation does not establish that the gateway’s bundled portal runtime was patched. The advisory marks R81 and R81.10 as end-of-support and supplies no fixed Take for them.

If patching must wait, the advisory describes stopping DynamicCLI and preventing its restart. That disables dependent Dynamic CLI commands, so review the operational impact before applying the vendor’s procedure. It addresses the escalation path, not the separate portal vulnerability.

During investigation, preserve and review /var/log/dynamicCli.log, portal logs and authentication records. Check Point describes unexpected commands outside the legitimate Clish wrapper as suspicious. Its fixed daemon logs rejected unauthorized callers; a rejected request records a blocked escalation attempt, not successful root access.

The vendor’s incident report describes backdoors that survive reboots and can tamper with firewall logs. Installing a patch does not remove that access. If compromise is suspected, follow incident-response procedures with the vendor, including investigation of connected systems and credentials. The reported movement to ESXi makes the gateway only one part of that review.

What is established

Evidence status: vendor-reported production exploitation, with CISA listing the local flaw as known exploited. CISA added CVE-2026-123039 on November 13, flags forensic triage and supplies a November 16 federal remediation due date. That catalog date is neither first exploitation nor original publication; the deadline is not a universal private-sector legal requirement.

Check Point dates the first wave to October 30, targeting Israeli organizations with some destructive activity. A broader November 2 wave reached multiple countries; it reports no evidence of destruction in that second wave. SecurityWeek’s Ionut Arghire also reports the findings, relying on Check Point’s investigation.

Caveat: Check Point is the affected vendor and sells security products. It explicitly leaves the operator’s identity and motive unresolved despite overlaps with previously documented tooling.