Bunny says replacement of managed TLS certificates and revocation of affected certificates are complete after an infrastructure-supplier incident. Its November 4 update says Let’s Encrypt has published every revocation in its Certificate Revocation Lists. Customers supplying their own certificates should confirm completion of the separate precaution described in the earlier notice.

Evidence status: a supplier intrusion reported by Bunny, with downstream access unresolved. Neither Bunny nor its provider has found evidence of unauthorized access to Bunny’s server. The company explicitly says it cannot completely rule that out. Precautionary certificate replacement is not confirmation that keys were stolen.

Update — November 4, 2026, 10:50 EST

Bunny’s 13:38 UTC November 4 update adds a concrete revocation milestone to the October 31 replacement report. It says every Let’s Encrypt certificate on the affected server has been revoked with reason “key compromise”, with every revocation now published. Certificate Revocation Lists, or CRLs, let clients check whether a certificate has been withdrawn.

The company says clients that check revocation will reject the old certificates and replacements now in use are unaffected. Its “key compromise” revocation reason is a precautionary status here, not a new forensic finding that private keys were stolen. The provider’s investigation remains ongoing.

This updates our earlier account of the unresolved revocation discrepancy raised on Hacker News. It is Bunny’s later completion claim, not an independent check of each customer’s certificate. The new notice says customers need do nothing for the replacements now in use. It does not explicitly withdraw the earlier instruction for customer-supplied certificates; confirm that work separately if you manage your own keys.

One node held more than cached content

Bunny first published the incident notice on October 28 at 11:40 UTC. The affected supplier reported unauthorized access involving third-party server-management software. A Bunny CDN node in Armenia ran on a server supplied by that provider. A CDN, or content delivery network, serves cached material from geographically distributed servers.

Bunny says it stopped routing traffic to that node within 20 minutes of the alert. It preserved relevant security logs, wiped the server, revoked its access to other systems and permanently removed it.

If someone accessed that node, Bunny says the potentially exposed material included temporarily cached content, Pull Zone configurations and TLS certificates. Pull Zones hold settings for retrieving and serving a site’s content. Bunny says account data was not stored there and its internal systems were unaffected.

TLS certificates identify a server; their matching private keys must remain secret. Replacing a certificate with a newly generated key, then revoking the old certificate, addresses possible exposure of that signing credential.

Separate managed certificates from customer-supplied ones

Bunny’s response has three distinct parts:

  • Platform domains: the original notice said certificates for b-cdn.net and bunny.run had already been revoked and reissued.
  • Managed custom domains: the October 31 update reports replacement with new private keys. The November 4 update adds completed revocation-list publication. Bunny says these customers need take no action.
  • Customer-supplied certificates: the October 31 notice recommends revocation and reissuance with new private keys. Managed-certificate replacement does not establish completion of this customer’s separate task.

Check which certificate arrangement each domain uses before deciding the work is complete. Follow the issuer’s revocation and replacement process for customer-supplied certificates; contact Bunny support if ownership or deployment is unclear. No customer-installable patched release or CVE is specified in this notice.

Bunny has stopped using the affected provider. It also says it is changing configuration distribution so each point of presence, a regional serving location, receives only the configurations and certificates for sites it actively serves. This is a stated reduction in what one server holds, not independent evidence that the redesign has finished everywhere.

What the thread adds

In the Hacker News discussion, usr1106 distinguishes public certificates from potentially exposed private server keys. That terminology matters because the customer’s action is to generate a new key as well as obtain a replacement certificate.

ptsneves says the customer-managed revocation instruction appeared at the end of their email. The participant interprets that instruction as proof of compromise; Bunny’s disclosure does not establish that conclusion.

At 21:53 UTC on October 31, thenaderman reports that their old keys had not yet been revoked. That self-report follows Bunny’s 12:50 UTC completion notice and conflicts with its account. Bunny’s later November 4 notice says revocation-list publication is now complete, as described in the update above. Customers unsure about their own replacement should ask support to confirm the specific certificate’s status.

From a 45-comment thread, in HN’s own order.

Caveat: Bunny is reporting on its own supplier incident; the notice provides no independent forensic finding or complete inventory of potentially exposed customer material.