Meredith Whittaker explains why Signal is restricting operating-system AI assistants from reading its screens. Encryption protects messages in transit, but assistants can copy them after they appear on a participant’s device. Those copies leave Signal’s control, potentially exposing everyone in the conversation.

  • The workaround costs a familiar feature. Signal blocks screenshots on iOS 27 and enables Android’s Screen security when it detects supported assistant access. Users can disable the protection to regain screenshots.
  • Coverage has gaps. Signal says it cannot reliably block screenshots on macOS, and Android support varies. Reading files on the device remains another possible access route. For macOS 27, Signal recommends adding it to System Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps to block proactive Siri access.
  • The requested fix is broader than screen protection. Whittaker wants documented app-level controls over AI access to screens, files, notifications and other interfaces, without sacrificing ordinary functionality.

Caveat: screenshot blocking is an incomplete mitigation, not a guarantee against agents accessing messages through other channels.

The 308-comment thread on Hacker News adds a documentation proposal and disagreement over who should control access.

What the thread adds

  • cimnine — asks Signal to publish its investigative findings: “If it were something like a living document (wiki or repo), there could even be collaboration, where others share their findings.”
  • Barbing — points to Siri’s app-exclusion setting. EFF’s October 28 walkthrough confirms that iOS 27.2 users can open Settings > Siri > Excluded Apps, tap Add Apps, and select Signal. EFF says this also blocks explicitly requested onscreen analysis of excluded apps. These controls apply to the device configured; contacts must make their own choices.
  • nl — wants explicit permission for personal automation: “I use Signal but it annoys me that I can’t use some kind of permission based system to give my agents access to my chats.”
  • dustfinger — proposes separating private and agent-enabled activity: “Use another device for activities where you have decided the benefits of agents outweigh privacy risks.”
  • sbarre — objects to that burden: “I should be able to expect basic privacy in my day-to-day chats without needing to spend time/money/resources setting up a goddamn second device just to have truly private chats with my friends and family.”

HN handles are pseudonymous; HN publishes no per-comment scores. Ordering is HN’s own ranking, and this selection is a slice of the thread, not a consensus.